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In their article, Two Models of Pre-Plea Discovery in
Criminal Cases: An Empirical Comparison, Professors Turner
and Redlich ostensibly compare North Carolina’s “open-file”
criminal discovery with Virginia’s “closed-file” discovery. Based
on their survey results, they conclude that open-file discovery is
*
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“a better guarantor of informed decisions and efficient process in
criminal cases.”1 While we appreciate the authors’ justifiable
concerns about the relative reliability of criminal convictions
between Virginia and North Carolina, we must disagree with
their methodology and, as a result, many of their conclusions.
Rather than refute line-by-line, I will make a few brief general
comments on behalf of Virginia’s prosecutors.
I. Methodology
A. Perceptions
Our problem with the article begins with its title. The title of
the article claims that this is an “empirical” study, which
connotes that the scientific method was used; yet the body of the
article proves otherwise. While the authors repeatedly note that
prosecutors and defense counsel provided vastly different
answers, they also concede that their “survey focuses on the
perceptions of those involved in discovery and therefore does not
directly test the effects of open-file discovery against those of
more restrictive discovery.”2 In fact, “[p]articularly when it comes
to defense attorneys, perceptions of what is disclosed may, in
many situations, be educated guesses.”3
The fault lies in much of the methodology. While the authors
include in the appendix the survey given to prosecutors,4 they do
not include the survey given to defense attorneys. The authors do
not explain that omission, although they do provide excerpts of
the defense attorney’s survey in the article. One example is this
question: “In felony cases, what types of documents does the
prosecutor turn over either as part of the initial discovery
package or later, but before a defendant pleads guilty?”5
1. Jenia I. Turner & Allison D. Redlich, Two Models of Pre-Plea Discovery
in Criminal Cases: An Empirical Comparison, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285, 286
(2016).
2. Id. at 315 (emphasis added).
3. Id. at 374 (emphasis added).
4. See id. at 386–99 (outlining the survey questions the authors asked
prosecutors).
5. Id. at 324.
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Respondents are limited only to the answers, “Never,”
“Sometimes,” or “Always.”6 Interestingly, the types of documents
listed include information that almost never appears in the
standard felony case, such as statements of non-testifying
experts.7 In another question, the authors ask defense counsel
how often prosecutors turn over impeachment evidence in their
possession and evidence not in their possession but
“requestable.”8 “Requestable” is not defined. By definition,
defense counsel would have little to no idea whether such
evidence even exists and yet 47.5% of the Virginia respondents
and 33% of the North Carolina respondents claim “Never.”9
As someone who has been a prosecutor in Virginia for thirtytwo years, it is not hard for me to conclude that most prosecutors
and defense counsel, regardless of where they practice, have very
different perceptions from one another about many facets of
criminal law and procedure. The truth for many of those facets is
probably somewhere in the middle. Rather than being entitled
“An Empirical Comparison,” the article should be entitled “A
Perceptional Comparison.”
B. Non-Representative Sampling
There is another more glaring problem with the authors’
statistics and one that compounds its reliance on perceptions.
This problem is their use of a non-representative convenience
sample,10 which is a form of non-probability sampling.11
The authors concede that they did not attempt to collect data
from a representative sample of prosecutors or defense
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 332.
9. Id.
10. Professor of Statistics David Freedman warns that “[s]tatistical
inference from convenience samples is a risky business.” DAVID FREEDMAN,
STATISTICAL MODELS AND CAUSAL INFERENCE 40 (David Collier et al. eds., 2009).
11. See generally Samuel R. Lucas, An Inconvenient Dataset: Bias and
Inappropriate Inference in the Multilevel Model, 48 QUALITY & QUANTITY 1619–
49 (2014) (explaining sample design features that are required for unbiased
estimation of macro-level multilevel model parameters and the use of tools for
statistical inference).
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attorneys.12 It appears that the sole qualification that the authors
sought from a respondent was that the person was willing and
had the time and ability to complete the survey.
Indeed, the authors intended that respondents to the survey
self-select.13 Self-selection is a survey bias that inherently
produces a non-representative sample and one that exaggerates
certain perspectives over others.14
Even worse, the survey also suffers from a unique form of
convenience sampling called “snowball sampling.”15 Snowball
sampling is a non-probability sampling technique that is used by
researchers to identify potential subjects in studies where
subjects are hard to locate.16 In this case, the authors asked
elected prosecutors in Virginia who were interested in
participating to help them identify assistants in their own office
who would also participate.17 We have no idea what method was
used, if any, by those elected prosecutors in selecting assistants to
participate. But why conduct a snowball sample of public
officials? By definition, we should not be hard to locate.
C. Low Response Rates
The authors acknowledge that one of their “methodological
caveats” was the low response rate.18 For Virginia prosecutors,
the authors sent out a survey link to the 120 Commonwealth’s
Attorneys offices, but only thirty-seven offices agreed to
participate at all.19 185 prosecutors (24% of all Virginia
prosecutors) began the survey.20 However, for reasons that are
never explained, only 122 of these completed the survey (16% of
12. Turner & Redlich, supra note 1, at 321.
13. Id.
14. Alan Beardsworth & Teresa Keil, The Vegetarian Option: Varieties,
Conversions, Motives and Careers, 40 SOC. REV. 253, 261 (1992).
15. Leo A. Goodman, Snowball Sampling, 32 ANNALS OF MATHEMATICAL
STAT. 148, 148 (1961).
16. Id.
17. See Turner & Redlich, supra note 1, at 316–19 (describing the process
the authors used to identify survey participants).
18. Id. at 373.
19. Id. at 317.
20. Id.
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all Virginia prosecutors).21 In other words, 34%, or more than a
third of the participants, withdrew from the survey before
completion. We are given no explanation as to why; nor do the
authors explain whether their survey, the types of questions, the
length of the survey, the format, or technical issues prevented a
significant portion of the respondents from responding. Perhaps
the survey asked questions that were impossible to answer.
In North Carolina, the numbers were even lower—only
11.5% of prosecutors answered the survey and, again, the authors
made no effort to make sure their sample was representative.22 It
appears that the authors were merely interested in having some
data, rather than in the quality of that data.
For defense attorneys, the numbers are just as low. 30% of
the Virginia private defense counsel who initially responded
failed to complete the survey.23 Only 14.2% of all private defense
counsel invited to participate actually participated.24 In North
Carolina, only forty-three of the 284 Public Defenders in the state
responded to the survey.25 Only 7.5% of private counsel responded
to the survey.26
The low response rates suggest survey flaws but the authors
don’t seem to accept that explanation. For example, the authors
attempt to explain why they could not find more data on formal
and informal “discovery waiver” (another undefined term).27
Rather than admit that their sample was non-representative and
therefore invalid, they simply claim “it is likely that discovery
waivers—whether formal or informal—are indeed rare.”28
However, the authors’ conclusion runs counter to the conclusion
reached by the U.S. Supreme Court that such waivers are an
integral part of the plea bargaining process, especially in
narcotics distribution cases.29
21. Id.
22. Id. at 318.
23. Id. at 321.
24. Id. at 318.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 321.
27. See id. at 346–52 (discussing discovery waivers and the failed
expectation that they would be more common in open-file jurisdictions).
28. Id. at 351.
29. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 632 (2002) (noting that the
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The problem is not merely the number of respondents but the
fact that the authors never assured that their respondents were
actually representative of their state. 69% of all Virginia
prosecutors’ offices did not participate in the survey.30 If all of
those offices engaged in discovery waivers, the quality of the data
would be radically different. In addition, the survey failed to
represent offices by size and by rural versus suburban versus
urban, which the authors admit.31
The authors acknowledge that their sample is “nonrepresentative” of attorneys in Virginia and North Carolina.32 At
that point, the question of whether the survey is valid should
have been over. However, the authors insist that because their
respondents share the same general demographic characteristics
of attorneys in Virginia and North Carolina (race, gender, and
years of experience), it is appropriate to draw conclusions about
the respondents to the survey.33 There is no factual basis for that
conclusion.
D. Similarity of Virginia and North Carolina
The authors state that they “chose Virginia and North
Carolina because they are geographically close and have
populations of similar size.”34 That is true but one would think
that it would be far more important to find states that are legally
similar but for their discovery rules.
As the article points out, Virginia has 120 elected
prosecutors; North Carolina has forty-four.35 This disparity in
Government relies on plea bargaining to resolve 90% of its criminal cases).
30. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (stating that only thirtyseven of the 120 Virginia prosecutor offices responded to the survey).
31. See Turner & Redlich, supra note 1, at 376 (“One feature we did not
consider is the size of offices (and related to this, whether offices were in rural or
urban areas).”).
32. Id. at 321.
33. Id. at 319–20.
34. Id. at 316. The two states share a 300+ mile border and have
approximate populations of 8.4 million and 10 million respectively. Population
of
Virginia
in
2016,
POPULATION
2016
(Jan.
13,
2016),
http://population2016.com/population-of-virginia-in-2016.html (last visited Aug.
29, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
35. Turner & Redlich, supra note 1, at 317.
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numbers exists because Virginia is unique amongst the states—
cities are independent and not part of any county. In Virginia,
judges are selected by the legislature,36 parole has been
abolished,37 juries decide sentences as well as guilt,38 jury trials
are bifurcated between the guilt phase and the sentencing phase
with prior criminal records being provided in the latter phase,39
and bench trials replace jury trials if both the defendant and the
Commonwealth waive.40 In North Carolina, judges are elected
directly by citizens,41 there is a modified parole system,42 there is
judge but not jury sentencing,43 and the state constitution was
only just recently amended to allow defendants (but not the
State) to waive a jury trial.44
Perhaps one of these differences, or a synergy between
several of these differences, has a far more profound impact on
the criminal justice systems in these states than different rules of
discovery. Unfortunately, the authors do not address the impact
of these differences.
E. Failure to Define Terms
1. “Discovery” and “Exculpatory Evidence”
The article uses these terms interchangeably but we know
they have different meanings. A criminal defendant’s “right to
receive from prosecutors exculpatory evidence material is a right
that the Constitution provides as part of its basic fair trial
guarantee.”45 But at the same time, “[t]here is no general
constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case.”46
36. VA. CONST., art. VI, § 7.
37. VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-165.1.
38. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295.1.
39. Id.
40. See generally Wright v. Commonwealth, 357 S.E.2d 547 (Va. 1987).
41. N.C. CONST., art. IV, § 16.
42. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-81B.
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-81.
44. N.C. CONST., art. I, § 24.
45. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002) (citing Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
46. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977).
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In addition, the article does not differentiate between a
prosecutor’s constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory evidence
and his ethical duty under the Rule 3.8 equivalent of his state’s
Code of Professional Conduct.47 There are significant differences
between each concerning the timing of the disclosure and the
extent of responsibility for vicarious knowledge.
2. “Open File”
The article compares Virginia and North Carolina discovery
practices with particular focus on “open file” discovery.48 But the
article never tells us what is meant by “open file” discovery. It
could mean that the file is handed over to defense counsel with no
redactions. It could mean that the file is handed over to defense
counsel with redactions of witness personal identifying
information, like social security numbers or mobile phone
numbers. It could mean that the file is handed over to defense
counsel with redactions of the identity of undercover officers or
cooperating informants. It could mean that defense counsel is
allowed to merely inspect the file. It could mean the prosecutor
makes and sends to defense counsel a separate copy of the file.
The article fails to define the term “open file” discovery and
with good reason: because there are so many versions of “open
file” policies, conducting a general survey that takes those
differences into account would have been a herculean task.
Rather than separating survey results by jurisdiction according
to what kind of “open file” policy was in place, the survey instead
lumps Virginia jurisdictions into two categories: “open file” and
“closed file.”49
This failure to define terms becomes important when the
authors reveal that North Carolina does not do “open file”
discovery for misdemeanors at all.50 In addition, there is no right
47. VA. SUP. CT. R. PT 6 2 RPC 8.3.
48. See Turner & Redlich, supra note 1, at 286 (noting the different
approaches to discovery employed by North Carolina and Virginia).
49. In fact, the Justice & Professionalism Committee of the Virginia
Association of Commonwealth’s Attorneys has just begun compiling what
material is disclosed by the various Virginia offices that do “open file “discovery.
50. See Turner & Redlich, supra note 1, at 378 n.377 (referencing a case
and an article both affirming the superior court original jurisdiction
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to discovery in district court at all and the right to “open file” only
begins if a case has original jurisdiction in superior court.51 If a
case is resolved in district court, the defendant never has a right
to discover at all.
However, many Virginia jurisdictions have “open file”
policies that include misdemeanors and felonies that are pending
in district court. In that way, Virginia discovery can be far
broader than North Carolina discovery because a substantial
number of felony cases are resolved in district court and
defendants have a discovery right in district court.52 This fact
should have been a significant discussion in the survey and in the
article, but instead is given only a footnote.
3. “Turn Over”
The article also fails to define the term “turn over.” For
example, it compares Virginia and North Carolina on whether the
government must “turn over” a search warrant. In Virginia, a
search warrant and its affidavit are public records per se without
any action or participation by the prosecutor unless the
prosecutor obtains special permission to temporarily seal the
warrant and affidavit.53 The answer, therefore, for all Virginia
jurisdictions should be that prosecutors always “turn over” search
warrants and affidavits. However, the authors’ survey reports
46.2% of Virginia prosecutors answer “never” or “sometimes.”54
“Turn over” is also confusing in this survey because it
conflates putting a document in a file with assuring that defense
counsel actually looks at or receives the document. It has been my
experience over the years that defense counsel often misses the
significance of particular material (or perhaps do not read it at
all) contained in the discovery file and then later claim that it
was never disclosed.
In addition, does “turn over” mean producing a document
itself or the information contained therein? According to the
requirement for the North Carolina open file discovery rule to apply).
51. Id.
52. VA. SUP. CT. R. 7C:5; VA. SUP. CT. R. 8:15.
53. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-54.
54. Turner & Redlich, supra note 1, at 323.
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survey, 3.7% of Virginia defense counsel report that prosecutors
“never” turn over a defendant’s criminal record, with a further
13.2% reporting “sometimes.” Because this result is completely
contrary to existing Virginia law, it is unclear what the
respondents possibly could have meant. It could mean they did
not receive the actual printout from the state and national police
databases55 but only received a written summary from the
prosecutor.
F. Apparent Bias
Repeatedly, when their data was in conflict, the authors
suggest that prosecutors provided misleading responses and
therefore discount some of the data collected by their survey. The
authors, however, never make similar accusations of defense
counsel. That suggests to us that the authors carry an inherent
bias.
One instance where the authors suggest prosecutors are
misleading is when the survey data fell into conflict regarding
whether prosecutors disclose Brady evidence.56 The authors write
that, in light of the fact that their survey coincided with public
debate over discovery reform in Virginia, “consciously or
unconsciously, some Virginia prosecutors may have been eager to
show that they are disclosing Brady material at high rates and
that there is no pressing need for reforming the rules.”57
However, the authors never, at any point, consider that
defense counsel might have consciously or unconsciously been
eager to show that they are not receiving Brady material in an
effort to demonstrate a pressing need to reform the rules. That
suggests that the authors conclude only prosecutors are prone to
falsify answers for political gain.
The authors demonstrate a predetermined bias in favor of
their proposed hypothesis to the exclusion of any contradictory

55. These databases are the National Crime Information Center (NCIC)
and Virginia Criminal Information Center (VCIN).
56. See Turner & Redlich, supra note 1, at 331 (acknowledging the
unexpectedly different results of prosecutors from Virginia).
57. Id. at 337.
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data.58 For example, the authors attempt to explain away data
that is contradictory and claim it supports their hypothesis.59 In
North Carolina, prosecutors reported significantly lower rates of
disclosure than Virginia prosecutors. However, in North
Carolina, defense attorneys reported significantly higher rates of
disclosure than Virginia defense attorneys.60 Thus, the data could
support either of two conclusions—that the authors’ hypothesis is
correct or that it is incorrect. Instead, the authors decided to
conclude that the defenders were accurate in their responses and
the prosecutors were inaccurate, and the authors found that the
data supported their conclusion “that open-file discovery produces
more consistent disclosure of Brady material.”61
Most shockingly, the authors openly dismiss reports from
prosecutors as being false.62 The authors conclude that “open-file
discovery does not increase the risk of witness intimidation.”63
However, Virginia and North Carolina prosecutors detail several
concrete, factual instances where open-file discovery actually
endangered witnesses.64 In one instance, a prosecutor described
how information provided in open-file discovery led to the murder
of a witness and the witness’s wife.65 The authors apparently
dismiss these reports as being inaccurate.
Since the authors are not practicing lawyers and have no
experience in law enforcement, their apparent bias causes them
to make similarly biased conclusions that are not based in fact or
evidence. For example, when addressing “open file” discovery in
misdemeanor cases, they allege “misdemeanor cases are less
likely to raise issues of witness safety than felony cases.”66
Many prosecutors and law enforcement officers, and probably
defense counsel, would take issue with this blanket statement,
58. See id. at 331 (stating the hypothesis that “open file produces better
disclosure of exculpatory evidence”).
59. Id. at 331.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See infra Part II.C (discussing how victim and witness safety are
important concerns in the open0file discovery).
63. Id. at 360.
64. Id. at 359–60.
65. Id. at 359.
66. Id. at 379 n. 378.
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especially prosecutors who handle domestic and family violence
cases.
II. Thoughts on Where We Are and Where We Are Going
As noted in the Article, on December 2, 2014, the Virginia
Supreme Court Special Committee on Criminal Discovery Rules
issued its report recommending “broader and earlier discovery.”67
I happened to serve on that committee. The twenty-nine-member
committee consisted of judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys,
and others involved throughout the criminal justice system.
Unfortunately, at no point during the committee meetings was
there ever any discussion whether rules modifications in Virginia
were necessary in the first place.
On November 13, 2015, the Virginia Supreme Court issued
the following order:
On December 2, 2014 came the Special Committee on Criminal
Discovery Rules and submitted its final report, which included
proposed revisions to [the rules of criminal discovery]. Having
considered the Committee’s report and the public comments
submitted in response thereto, the Court declines to adopt the
Committee’s recommendations.68

A few days later, Chief Justice Donald Lemons told the Richmond
Times-Dispatch that a “more incremental approach would be
more palatable to the Court.” 69 He also said that it was:
[A]pparent that the proposals are the result of ‘trade-offs’ in
the negotiations between interest groups. It would be difficult
for the Court to accept some of the proposals and not all of
them as a package because the Court cannot be certain about
the interdependent nature of the compromises.70
67. Id. at 337, n. 210.
68. Frank Green, Justices Reject Recommendations on Pretrial Discovery in
Criminal
Cases,
RICHMOND
TIMES
(Nov.
26,
2015),
http://www.richmond.com/news/article_a7518ce0-3e7c-5696-8cc20dda708dd9b1.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2016) (on file with the Washington
and
Lee
Law
Review).
The
order
is
available
online
at
http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/amendments/2015_1113_discovery_orde
r.pdf.
69. Green, supra note 68.
70. Id.
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Having engaged in those negotiations, let me comment on some of
my basic considerations during the process.
A. Distinguishing Discovery from Exculpatory Evidence
From the start, it is absolutely critical to distinguish between
statute/rule-based discovery and constitutionally-mandated
exculpatory evidence. “Brady is ‘a disclosure rule, not a discovery
rule.’ Indeed, ‘[t]here is no general constitutional right to
discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one.’”71
Unfortunately, far too often these terms are used
interchangeably. During the dialogue of the past few years,
proponents of modifying Virginia’s discovery rules have cited
examples of wrongful convictions allegedly gained by discovery
rule violations. When pressed for specific examples, they
invariably cite cases where the violation was a failure to disclose
exculpatory evidence. For that reason, I concluded that these
were “discovery” answers in search of an “exculpatory evidence”
problem.
Please do not misunderstand me. I am as opposed to
wrongful convictions based on exculpatory evidence violations as
anyone. But I find it odd that these proponents are arguing for a
change to Rule 3A:11 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of
Virginia to mandate the disclosure of evidence which the Bill of
Rights already guarantees. It is almost as if they are saying the
Rule is more important than the Constitution.
For this reason, I disagreed with the Committee’s conclusion
that a new subsection requiring the disclosure of exculpatory
evidence should have been added to Rule 3A:11 dealing with
criminal discovery. The Bill of Rights already requires that a
prosecutor disclose material exculpatory evidence to the defense
“in time for it to be used effectively by the defendant.”72 Rule
3.8(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct already requires that
a prosecutor “make timely disclosure . . . of the existence of
evidence which the prosecutor knows tends to negate the guilt of

71. Commonwealth v. Tuma, 740 S.E.2d 14, 18 (Va. 2013) (citations
omitted).
72. Bramblett v. Commonwealth, 513 S.E.2d 400, 409 (Va. 1999).
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the accused.”73 At best, the new subsection would have been
redundant; at worst, the timing of the disclosure ran contrary to
the Constitution and the Rules of Professional Conduct.
B. Avoiding Trial by Ambush through Reciprocity
The aim of trials is to find the truth. Uncovering the truth is
the paramount goal of the adversary system. All the rules of
decorum, ethics, and procedure are meant to aid the truthfinding process. Ambush, trickery, stealth, gamesmanship,
one-upmanship, surprise have no legitimate role to play in a
properly conducted trial. This is so whether the gamesman is
the defendant or the Commonwealth.74

If there is any justification for modifying the discovery
requirements of Rule 3A:11, it should be to uncover the truth and
avoid “trial by ambush.” That goes for both the prosecution and
the defense. For this reason, I advocated in the Committee for as
much reciprocal discovery as is constitutionally permitted.
I realized that under the proposed rule change the
prosecution would be disclosing far more non-expert material
than the defense. But I also realized that the prosecution
probably has a lot more information in its file than the defense
has. The proposed changes would have gone a long way towards
promoting the truth-finding function of trial, especially in the
areas of expert testimony and witness lists.
C. Safeguarding Personal Information of Victims and Witnesses
Of grave concern to the prosecutors and law enforcement
officials on the Committee was how to provide enhanced
discovery while safeguarding personal information about victims
and witnesses to crimes. This problem has grown in significance
over the past few years as the availability of personal digital
devices has grown exponentially.
For a long time, a significant number of prosecutors in the
Commonwealth have complied with their duty to disclose
73.
74.

VA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d).
Bennett v. Commonwealth, 374 S.E.2d 303, 311 (Va. 1988).
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exculpatory evidence and discovery through an informal “open
file” policy. Under this policy, defense counsel is free to come to
the prosecutor’s office to read and review the contents of the
prosecution file but is not given a separate hard copy of that file
to take back to the defendant. Counsel is free to make all the
notes they wanted and, in some instances, dictate relevant
portions of the file for subsequent transcription by counsel’s legal
assistant. There was little opportunity for abuse as counsel would
seldom take the extra time needed to record information such as
social security numbers, home addresses, or mobile phone
numbers.
That opportunity for abuse all changed with the advent of
“smart” technology and Internet social media. With such
technology, the prosecution file could be scanned or photographed
in its entirety. The file then walked out of the prosecutor’s office
along with defense counsel. Absent agreements such as those
discussed in Legal Ethics Opinion 1864,75 this digital file
belonged to the defendant—if not before trial then certainly at
the termination of the representation.76 Exact copies of police
reports with witnesses’ names, addresses, telephone numbers,
social security numbers, and other personal information came
directly into the hands of criminal defendants. Many of these
defendants have no qualms about posting these police reports on
Facebook or other social media, hoping to intimidate witnesses
from cooperating with law enforcement now or in the future.
With this danger in mind, the prosecutors and law
enforcement officials on the Committee insisted that victim and
witness safety had to be a central facet of any proposed rule
change. For this reason, a new subsection to Rule 3A:11 was
proposed. The proposal would have allowed the party in
possession of sensitive information to redact it before the
issuance of any court order to do so. The party wishing to receive
such information would then need to file a motion in court. The
thought here was one of long-term judicial economy; within a
short period of time, both prosecutors and defense counsel would
75. See VA. ST. B. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL ETHICS, LEGAL ETHICS OPINION
1864 (Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.vsb.org/docs/LEO/1864.pdf (considering the
legality of a defense attorney agreeing not to provide certain information about
witnesses to his or her client).
76. VA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(e).
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have a good idea what information a court would and would not
order disclosed and the number of motions would go down.77
However, not all law enforcement officials felt that the
proposed subsection provided adequate protection. Thus, the only
minority report attached to the Committee’s report dealt with
this topic.
D. Minimizing Costs, Burdens, and Delays
This was my most significant concern during the committee
deliberation process. The changes proposed to Rule 3A:11 would
have significantly added time and financial burdens to all
prosecutors’ offices. It would be one thing if each prosecutor in
the Commonwealth carried only one felony prosecution at a time;
it is a totally different prospect when you consider the reality
that, nationally, most prosecutors carry caseloads of 100–200
felonies at a time.78
Even without a change to Rule 3A:11, prosecutors are facing
greatly increasing discovery demands. With modern technology,
law enforcement generates far greater discoverable information.
Dash-mounted camera video, body worn camera video, and
jailhouse telephone audio are just a few examples of this new
technology. One individual traffic stop could generate several
hours of video and audio evidence.
When you added the impact of the proposed changes,
workload and financial costs would have gone up dramatically. In
order to redact the protected personal information contained in
paper reports, a prosecutor would have to make a photocopy of
every page of every report. Every page with protected material
would then need to be marked out with a felt-tip marker. In order
to keep this information protected from someone who will simply
hold that page up to a light bulb, the prosecutor would then need
77. See SUPREME COURT OF VA., REP. OF THE SPEC. COMM. ON CRIMINAL
DISCOVERY RULES TO THE CHIEF JUSTICES & JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
VA. MINORITY COMMENTS 55–56 (Dec. 2, 2014) (discussing the intimidation of
witnesses and costs associated with reforms).
78. See generally Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State
(Never) Rests: How Excessive Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U.
L. REV. 261 (2011) (noting the incredibly large case load prosecutors have to
handle).
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to make a second photocopy of that redacted page. The huge costs
in paper, ink cartridges, and felt-tip pens would pale in
comparison to the personnel expenses associated with the time
involved.
If we are going to expand the scope of criminal discovery in
Virginia, we have to find the proper time and resource-efficient
method to get this information from law enforcement and see that
all properly discoverable information is delivered to defense
counsel in a timely fashion. Otherwise, we will need to drastically
modify our criminal justice process, potentially plea- bargaining a
greater number of cases just to keep the criminal dockets
manageable.79
That resource-efficient method is digital prosecutorial casemanagement systems. These systems would need to be
compatible with law enforcement record management and
evidence systems. A prosecutor sitting at a desk could quickly
retrieve case history reports and law enforcement evidence. The
reports could be quickly read for sensitive information and a
digital copy created with such information redacted by a “click”
and “drag.” The digital file appropriate for discovery could then
be electronically transmitted to defense counsel with a digital
record or receipt of exactly what information was transmitted and
when. No paper, no ink cartridges, and theoretically no traveling
to or from the office would be needed in order to provide or
receive discovery.
The problem is that currently very few prosecutors have such
a case-management system and the costs of such systems are
prohibitive for many offices. The Executive Summary of the
Committee’s Report highlighted how crucial electronic or “ediscovery” would be to the Committee’s proposal and advocated
not only for a “statewide standard for filing and storage of case
information,” but that any such effort should “make
accommodation to allow for existing investments in technology.”80
Finally, let me conclude by stressing the Committee’s final
thoughts on the subject from its Executive Summary. “It is
79. This is why the discussion in Part I.D of the legal dissimilarities
between Virginia and North Carolina is critical.
80. SUPREME COURT OF VA., REP. OF THE SPEC. COMM. ON CRIMINAL
DISCOVERY RULES TO THE CHIEF JUSTICES & JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
VA., at vi (Dec. 2, 2014).
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emphasized that use of electronic document management is a key
to avoiding unnecessary costs, burdens and delays, as well as to
avoid misuse or abuse resulting from providing the accused or the
public inadvertent access to sensitive material.”81
III. Conclusion
We are sympathetic to the authors’ plight. They wanted to
collect statewide data from two diverse and complicated
jurisdictions, Virginia and North Carolina, and collect it from
busy attorneys who have little free time to help a couple of
professors who are curious about the actual practice of law. The
authors are clearly devoted to their hypothesis and firmly believe
it to be true. That does not, however, make their conclusions
valid, especially when based on unrepresentative samples and
unjustified interpretations of data.
As Chief Justice Lemons said, changes, if they are going to
come, are going to come incrementally in Virginia.82 Advents in
technology, especially electronic discovery, will help ease that
incremental process.

81. Id.
82. See Green, supra note 68 (“Justice Donald W. Lemons said he did not
presume to speak for the other justices, but he felt that a more incremental
approach would be more palatable to the court.”).

